












































This article makes two arguments based on the following observa-
tions: that, in El hombre y lo divino [hereafter, El hombre], María 
Zambrano, consciously following Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of 
European philosophical rationalism, makes an epistemological 
claim—namely, that humans cannot attain absolute truth rationally 
or by any other means—with the ethical corollary that humans 
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Abstract
In El hombre y lo divino, María 
Zambrano argues, like Nietzsche, 
that humans cannot attain truth 
rationally. She adds an ethical 
corollary to accept such lim-
itations. But Zambrano goes 
beyond Nietzsche in assuming 
the implications of her claim. 
Also, her prescription to suppose 
that the world has some ration-
ally unknowable portion (along 
with her praise of modernist 
art—Schoenberg and Picasso—
for discovering the unknowable) 
means that a logical extension 
of this praise, were it to contain 
film, might include not the 
Italian neorealism referenced in 
Zambrano’s writings on cinema, 
but the modernist Michelangelo 
Antonioni. 
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Resumen
En El hombre y lo divino, María 
Zambrano sostiene, como Nietzs-
che, que los seres humanos nunca 
alcanzarán la verdad racional-
mente. Agrega un corolario ético: 
hay que asumir tales limitaciones. 
Pero Zambrano va más allá que 
Nietzsche al aceptar las implica-
ciones de su postura. Además, su 
demanda de suponer que hay una 
porción incognoscible del mundo, 
unida a su elogio del arte moder-
nista (Schoenberg y Picasso) por 
descubrir lo incognoscible, implica 
que una extensión lógica de este 
elogio, si incluyera el cine, debería 
contener más que el neorrealismo 
italiano al que Zambrano hizo 
referencia en sus escritos fílmi-
cos, al modernista Michelangelo 
Antonioni.
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should accept the need to live with such epistemological limitations, 
embracing what Zambrano calls the “nothingness” that defies 
rational conceptualization.1 By maintaining, firstly, that Zambrano 
goes beyond Nietzsche in assuming the implications of an essentially 
limited human knowledge, this article follows Ana Bundgard’s 
analysis of the “greater radicalness” of Zambrano’s insistence that 
reason will always encounter some portion of the world “shrouded 
in shadows”,2 and Pedro Cerezo Galán’s discussion of how Zambra-
no went “beyond and deeper than Nietzsche” in “[stripping] the 
human ego of any shred of vanity”, like what Cerezo Galán calls 
Nietzsche’s self-aggrandizing “will to create” (as opposed to an 
acknowledgement of the impossibility of such creation as the 
generation of knowledge) in the midst of an unintelligible “original 
chaos”.3 Secondly, this article maintains that, given Zambrano’s 
ethical prescription to suppose that the world contains some un-
knowable portion, since Zambrano’s aesthetic philosophy explicitly 
praises such modernist art as “atonal music” and “the painting from 
certain periods of Picasso’s oeuvre” for “[making nothingness] 
visible”, and since these artforms reveal nothingness not through 
such harmonic consonance or single-point perspective as might 
betray excessive rational confidence but through typically uncertain 
dissonance and perspectival instability, then a logical extension of 
this list, were it to contain film, might include the modernist 
Michelangelo Antonioni’s ‘alienation tetralogy’: L’avventura, La 
notte, L’eclisse, and Deserto rosso. In her scarce writings on film, 
Zambrano referred favorably to Italian neorealism. However, relative 
to the uncomplicated moral theses of Roberto Rossellini’s Roma, 
città aperta and Germany, anno zero, Vittorio De Sica’s Ladri di 
biciclette, and Augusto Genina’s Cielo sulla palude, Antonioni offers 
better cinematic analogies to Picasso’s cubism, Schoenberg’s twelve-
tone scores, or Alban Berg’s Lulu, whose ability to “create the 
inaudible” or “turn disappearance into music” Zambrano explicitly 
lauded.4 
Zambrano’s epistemology
For Zambrano, humans must accept the limitations of their reason 
despite having a natural, even desirable aspiration to use it to find 
truth. She describes a hypothetical, pre-rational world where hu-
mans sense the “[overwhelming] inexorable presence of a superior 
force” that they “cannot identify”, which is their first contact with 
the sacred, or God: an unidentifiable, always invisible, higher being 
that “conceals reality” as it triggers what Zambrano calls a “visionary 
delirium”, or the paradox of humans’ first, clear-eyed rational 
meaning-seeking search for this awesome, elusive divine force, 
which is always accompanied by the madness-inducing feeling of 
being “watched without seeing” and unable “to see who is watch-
ing”.5 For Zambrano, humans’ desire to escape an original state of 
blindness by seeking the divine is both natural and essential to their 
existence, for “Man needs to see; he cannot remain in this blind 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
translations are mine. 
2. Bundgard, A., “Nietzsche y María 
Zambrano: nihilismo y creación”, Aurora: 
papeles del Seminario María Zambrano,  
nº. 10, 2009, 25-27.
3. Cerezo Galán, P., “La muerte de dios, la 
nada y lo sagrado en María Zambrano.” In 
María Zambrano: la visión más transpar-
ente, González Fuentes, J. A. and Beneyto 
Pérez, J. M. (eds)., Madrid, Trotta, 346.
4. Zambrano, M., Las palabras del regreso, 
Gómez Blesa, M., (ed)., Madrid, Cátedra, 
2009, 148.
5. Zambrano, M., El hombre y lo divino, 
Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económi-
ca, 2012, 29.
















































state”. However, this step into rationalism is also limiting in that it 
makes humans’ understanding of the world dependent not on any 
extra-rational reality, but on their own rationally conceived ideas, 
concepts, and abstractions. 
Human reason is born when humans go deliriously in search of 
God. However, this search, along with the related endeavor to 
obtain truth rationally, is necessarily fruitless because God is not a 
discrete being, but an omnipresent one that, in Zambrano’s words, 
“cannot be seen”—like the indiscernible God of Spinoza’s panthe-
ism, wherein God is everything and everything is God.6 In response 
to their inability to see God, humans make God appear, creating 
Him as an essentially rational product of the mind. God is the 
rational mind’s first construction, and ultimately, all things existing 
in the world as seen by the rational subject are mental products. 
Despite shortcomings of this way of seeing the world—e.g., that 
knowledge has no apparent basis outside the human mind—Zam-
brano believes that the rational thought that leads to an “appearance 
of the divine” is an essential step toward “mankind’s being able to 
manifest itself as such”, or “gaining a certain dose of freedom and a 
space in which to develop” as an essentially rational creature.7 
Indeed, this process is both essential and beneficial, for, “in enabling 
the emergence of the profane world”, “the divine presence intro-
duces a degree of clarity in the more primitive, sacred world’s 
previously undifferentiated reality”. The rational mind’s construction 
of God and the world is not entirely a bad thing, for without 
mentally constructed categories, concepts, and abstractions, human 
life is impossible. Moreover, Zambrano hypothesizes not only that 
“the greatness of human culture is due to humans’ ability to make 
God appear” and depends on reason’s so enabling man to make 
sense of the chaos into which, according to Zambrano’s hypotheti-
cal, pre-rational world, humans are born, but also, more extremely, 
that “there has been no great historical action, none of those tempo-
ral monuments we call ‘cultures’, that has not been accompanied, as 
an essential element, by humans’ first suffering and then creating 
God”.8 Humans are thus fatefully gripped between delirium, or the 
torment of being watched but unable to see what or who is watch-
ing them, and the subsequent rational construction of their environ-
ment that forces them to live in a world whose truth they themselves 
have rationally generated. Humans cannot remain in a state of 
delirium and so their work to understand, by means of reason, their 
originally chaotic surroundings “saves” them, as Zambrano put it, 
from such an unendurable existence.9 But it also “condemns” them, 
by making their connection to reality exclusively mediated by their 
own, essentially inexact mental constructs. 
So, Zambrano critiques not human reason per se, essential and 
beneficial as it is, but any use of it that mistakes rational construc-
tions for reality itself, or ignores that reason is initially triggered not 
18391_aurora_22_tripa_p.1-53.indd   18 1/2/21   10:08
19
aurora | n.º 22 | 2021 
Paul Cella





by the human mind, but an ever-present God and the delirium 
provoked by the sacred presence. For Zambrano, humans—particu-
larly in the modern West—have indeed not adequately recognized 
God’s original role in rational thought, and have taken inappropriate 
credit as artificers of their world. In effect, they have replaced God, 
but in so doing have left themselves alone and isolated in the world. 
Having broken all “contact with God”, Zambrano argues, and 
ceasing thus to be “recipients of anything coming from above or 
anywhere else”, they have found themselves in the precarious 
position of being their only, solipsistic point of reference, out of 
touch with anything “that does not emerge from themselves”.10 In 
such solitude, having confronted the limits of their reason—which 
are set at least in part by an unknowable divinity—humans have 
predictably lost their bearings and sunk into nihilism, as Nietzsche 
had already observed. Zambrano cites the Roman poet Lucretius’s 
declaration that “if God exists, He does not concern himself with 
mankind” as a relevant articulation (nearly two millennia before the 
publication of El hombre) of modernity’s nihilistic tendency and of 
what Zambrano calls the “emptiness” characteristic of the human 
experience lived in epistemological, God-less isolation.11 Zambrano 
warns that humans’ ignoring sacredness—which, based on God’s 
presumed original existence, must be “in fact more a denial of 
humanity itself than of the divine”—must harmfully condemn 
humankind constantly “to feel a void in the universe”, and so “to 
lose its being and turn slowly into an image of nothingness, a 
voiceless echo, a reflection of hollowness”. 
In addition to lamenting modern solitude and nihilism, Zambrano 
denounces the rational subject’s hubris in setting itself up as the 
epistemological center of the universe, forgetting God’s role in the 
birth of human reason. On this account, rational subjects are 
arrogant creatures, who seek in isolation to assert rational freedom, 
and inauthentically seek “to transcend that which is properly 
human”, or humanity’s necessarily tragic condition, according to 
which humans do not enjoy “pure freedom, without suffering, 
without tragedy” but are fated to “experience their freedom tragi-
cally” as coexistence with the unknown and unknowable.12 Against 
such a rational subject, Zambrano asserts that humans attain 
freedom not by severing the bonds tying them to their circumstanc-
es, but in a more Spinozian (or perhaps Orteguian) sense, by being 
conscious of necessity and embracing their circumstances, both of 
which include God. Nineteenth-century idealism—which, in 
Zambrano’s view, “took the knowing subject to its most extreme 
limit” by making “Cartesian clarity [...] its ultimate horizon”, having 
the rational mind self-referentially “locate in itself any necessary 
guarantee of its existence”, and defining Kant’s “transcendental 
subject” as the source of “absolute knowledge”—represents in El 
hombre the greatest manifestation of the hubris of human reason 
and, in Zambrano’s decidedly modest philosophy, a paradigm to 
overcome.13
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Zambrano’s ethics: beyond Nietzsche
Zambrano’s discussion of modernity’s allegedly hubristic, free 
rational subject, marks the beginning of the theory of ethics she 
proposes to a society that, dominated by philosophical rationalism, 
has turned away from the sacred. She calls for overcoming the 
self-referential nature of rationalism and reestablishing contact with 
sacredness, or with the epitome of otherness that, driving humans to 
make use of their own reason as it places them face to face with the 
unknowable, resists humans’ attempts to appropriate it for them-
selves. Zambrano urges humankind to accept a tragic fate to coexist 
with that which reason cannot comprehend—the unknowable that 
manifests itself as what Zambrano calls “voids” and “nothingness”. 
Zambrano develops a theory of ethics whose point of departure is an 
ideal human who accepts reason’s limitations and embraces the need 
to coexist with the sacred, or rational voids or nothingness, without 
trying to conceptualize or eliminate them from her worldview. In 
developing this theory, Zambrano recognizes a debt to Nietzsche, 
incorporating several Nietzschean concepts, such as the German 
philosopher’s own ideal Übermensch, eternal recurrence, and procla-
mation that God is dead. However, as I will discuss after a brief 
exposition on Nietzsche, Zambrano is nonetheless convinced that 
her ethical theory goes further than Nietzsche’s in rediscovering 
man’s original condition, or accepting the implications of humans’ 
epistemological limitations. 
Developed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s Übermensch rejects 
certain metaphysical answers to questions about truth, such as 
Plato’s positing that truth resides in the world of the Forms, or 
Christianity’s placement of truth in divine revelation. For Nietzsche, 
while Plato and Christianity lead humans to disdain the mundane as 
essentially untrue, the Übermensch Zarathustra more desirably 
affirms his love not for those who “first seek beyond the stars” but 
“sacrifice themselves to the Earth”.14 
If the Übermensch proclaims an unequivocal love for worldly life, the 
eternal recurrence—a concept Nietzsche introduced in his 1882 book 
The Gay Science and developed further a year later in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra—is a thought experiment intended to make humans ask 
themselves whether, if “a demon were to steal after [them] into 
[their] loneliest loneliness” and say, “This life as you now live it and 
have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times 
more”, they would “curse the demon who spoke thus” or, owing to a 
love for worldly existence as great as Zarathustra’s, they would 
answer: “You are a god and never have I heard anything more 
divine”.15 Eternal recurrence is not a metaphysical affirmation 
according to which the same series of events occurs in  
an endless cycle, but a hypothetical question that Nietzsche puts  
to humanity, asking whether it could endure repeating the same life 
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ad infinitum, thus bearing what Nietzsche called “the heaviest 
weight”.16 For Nietzsche, to respond affirmatively is the ultimate 
rejection of certainty-seeking rational metaphysics and confirmation 
of one’s love of life. Of course, Platonists and Christians could not 
accept this challenge and also remain consistent with the worldviews 
of their respective systems of belief—Platonists would prefer to 
discover the world of the Forms and Christians would prefer heav-
enly union with God to the eternal recurrence of their time spent  
on Earth. 
A main objective of Nietzsche’s philosophy is to encourage humans 
to attend to the reality of the world around them, rather than 
imagining more pleasing alternatives. Nietzsche believes that, by 
imagining the possibility of eternal recurrence, one equips himself 
with the kind of mental fortitude necessary to live well in this world, 
having been freed from the temptation of idealizing other possible 
worlds, whose presumed existence assuages the pain of existing in 
this one. 
Another Nietzschean concept, the death of God, serves a similar 
purpose. The phrase “God is dead” appeared first in The Gay Science, 
notably in section 125, entitled The Madman, which is a parable 
about a hysterical man who runs into a town square to announce 
the title’s shocking news. Like the challenge of the eternal recur-
rence, the announcement that God is dead defies modern individu-
als to live without looking beyond the physical world for answers to 
questions or alleviation of suffering. By stating that “we”, modern 
humanity, “have killed [God]”, Nietzsche makes clear that he is not 
making a theological proposition, but describing the reality that 
Christian doctrine—“[w]hat was holiest and mightiest of all that the 
world has yet owned”—is, in fact, no longer Western civilization’s 
authoritative moral foundation, having “bled to death under our 
knives”.17 In God’s absence, Western civilization is devoid of ethical 
authority, and Nietzsche asks readers how the West should go about 
reconstructing its moral bearings. The danger of a world without 
God, or some such morally authoritative system, is a lack of a 
common notion of justice. Nietzsche draws our attention to the 
contemporary existence of this void and (despite openly speculating 
whether the “greatness of [the] deed” of divine murder that created 
the void is “too great for us”) urges our reflection on how it should 
be filled. Significantly, he appears to insinuate a response to his 
exhortation in the last question the madman puts to the townspeo-
ple: “Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy 
of [God’s death at the hands of man]?” Perhaps the future of West-
ern civilization will depend on the emergence of people that fill 
God’s void, living not by religious doctrine, but self-imposed 
morality. 
Nietzsche and Zambrano’s philosophies react to fundamentally 
similar stimuli and pursue similar objectives. Both react to a civiliza-
















































tion that no longer looks to God for answers, and both propose 
methods of living without the comforting cohesiveness of a shared 
concept of the divine. However, Zambrano points to two basic 
points of divergence between Nietzsche and herself—first, that 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch errs as rationalism did by filling the void left 
by God with a theoretically limitless human consciousness; second, 
that announcing God’s death implies a confirmation of God’s 
existence, at least as a product of humans’ imagination or object of 
love. 
According to Zambrano, Nietzsche’s Übermensch, like the modern 
rational subject, will, in his attempt to fill God’s void, necessarily 
confront his own limitations. We might even understand Nietzsche 
as a continuation of the very rationalist-idealist paradigm he sought 
to dismantle. Rationalism exalts human reason to the point of 
denying God, but, Zambrano writes, Nietzsche fills the void left by 
God by “dreaming of the advent of a god born of himself ”.18 There 
is thus little difference between a God-like Übermensch and the 
deification of reason characteristic of rationalism. Both imply a life 
that projects itself into the future at the expense of a better under-
standing of one’s immediate surroundings, or Orteguian circum-
stances. Indeed, in her critique of the Übermensch, Zambrano 
bolsters her argument with a reference to Ortega’s critique of 
post-Cartesian philosophy’s scant concern for man’s circumstances 
and its “futurismo”—or its tendency to situate humans’ perfect 
realization in the future, when reason may have yielded a more 
complete understanding of the world. Zambrano suggests that we 
should understand Nietzsche similarly, or as privileging the future 
over the present, for it is precisely “the future reality of this Uber-
mensch that fills the void left by the disappearance of ‘the other 
world’”. 
So, in Zambrano’s reading of Nietzsche, God’s existence is denied 
but again manifested as a human desire to emulate divine perfec-
tion. Humans may naïvely think that distancing themselves from 
God constitutes liberation from metaphysical constraints, but, 
according to Zambrano, the opposite is true—by separating them-
selves from or “killing God”, humans lose what they love most; they 
“kill love”.19 When Nietzsche announces that God is dead, he 
implicitly laments that God, the object of humanity’s love, no 
longer exists; humans no longer have an ideal to which to aspire.20 
To further illustrate this idea, let us recall Zambrano’s description of 
humanity’s move from pre-rationalism to rationalism. Humans first 
use reason in attempting to identify God, or the persistent presence 
of the sacred they sense but cannot see. Humans fear this presence as 
what Zambrano describes as “the ultimate resistance to the diviniza-
tion of humanity”, but they no less adore it as constant, life-affirm-
ing stimulation of their desire to be one with God. And if Nietzsche, 
unable to tolerate separation between himself and the object of his 
love, aspires to eliminate it, or, as Zambrano alleges, “to immerse 
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himself in God, and so to be identical to God”, so that “there might 
be no difference between divine life and ours”, Zambrano, for her 
part, invites humanity to suppose the necessary existence of such a 
difference, or the impossibility of communion with the divine.21
Zambrano’s aesthetics: with Antonioni
El hombre names the insuperable distance between God and human-
ity nothingness, or that unknowable, “irreducible space that human 
freedom encounters in seeking to be absolute”.22 In ethical terms, 
Zambrano calls on humans to reject any rationalist urge to compre-
hend such an essentially enigmatic void and fatally to accept their 
being in limbo between the desire to know and the presence of the 
incognoscible, which “cannot be made into an idea [...] cannot be 
thought”, and so resists rational apprehension, being “never still”, 
“never the same”, always “ambiguous”.23 And Zambrano accompa-
nies this epistemologically-based moral injunction with correspond-
ing aesthetic approval of what she generally refers to as “modern 
art”, or, more specifically, “atonal music” and “the painting from 
certain periods of Picasso’s oeuvre”, which strive to render nothing-
ness manifest by tapping into its ever changing, “irremediable 
dissonance”, or “bringing contrary elements together without fully 
joining them” and, thus, embracing “dissonance without resolu-
tion”.24
A final hypothesis that I will explore is whether Zambrano’s ethics 
might find more adequate aesthetic expression not in Italian neorea-
lism—which occupies a significant portion of her little writing on 
film—but in Antonioni’s ‘alienation tetralogy’, a major achievement 
in Italian film from a decade after the neorealist titles referenced by 
Zambrano. It must be so if it is the case that the neorealist Roma: 
Open City, Germany: Year Zero, and Bicycle Thieves—by relying, like 
Western tonal (not atonal) music or like one-point perspective (not 
Picasso-style) painting, on what one might think of as the harmonic 
consonance or relative clarity of moral perspective of traditional 
narrative structures—do not exhibit Antonioni’s cinematic analogies 
of atonal music’s dissonant harmonies or cubist allusions to a reality 
that is, quoting Zambrano, “never still” or always “bringing contrary 
elements [e.g. perspectives] together without fully joining them”. 
Antonioni’s tetralogy renders visible what Zambrano calls reality’s 
“irremediable dissonance” by suggesting, in L’avventura, the impro-
bability of structuring a story around a single character, Anna, who, 
despite appearing alone in the opening scene, does no more to 
announce what we might call this film’s tonic key than does Lulu’s 
basic tone row. In fact, as in Berg’s largely atonal opera—where the 
basic row’s initial C natural is transposed to the start of Lulu’s 
characteristic row’s second ascending 4-note set or deep in Alwa’s 
unique series, which strings together every seventh note of the basic 
sequence—in L’avventura, it is only through a cinematic analogy of 
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op.cit., 185.
26. ibid., 184.
melodic variation, not harmonic structure, that Anna, following her 
sudden, early disappearance, resonates throughout the film: like 
when Claudia, a blonde, wears a dark wig to resemble her lost friend 
or when Claudia and Sandro, Anna’s boyfriend, make increasingly 
seldom and perfunctory attempts to find her, before apparently 
forgetting her altogether. 
Like Antonioni’s beginnings—which, as Berg and Schoenberg’s 
Second Viennese School did in music, broke with conventional 
narrative rules in film by not being primarily concerned with 
establishing durable themes—the middle sections of his films 
present the sort of non-hierarchical, horizontally-organized abun-
dance of detail one finds in the optimally diverse pitch sequences of 
Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire, in such modernist art as Picasso’s 
“Three Musicians” or the color fields of Mark Rothko (a kindred 
spirit of Antonioni in painting), or, through an ethical-aesthetic 
prescription, in Zambrano’s call for an art whose source of “har-
mony” or “unity” is its sheer “plenitude” of surface information,25 
where all elements, by virtue of their being “never still”, “never the 
same”, and always “ambiguous”, are also “without reference” or, as 
in a typical twelve-tone row, self-referential. Zambrano’s plenitude—
which I propose to understand as a state of unity where all things, 
including nothingness, achieve discreteness and mutual independen-
ce—characterizes the cinematography of Lidia’s long walk through 
Milan in La notte, where Antonioni’s signature tempi morti, or “dead 
time”, alert the audience to a reality beyond the relatively narrow, 
plot or character-focused perspective one finds in Rome: Open City’s 
conflict between righteous Romans and evil Nazis, or in Germany: 
Year Zero’s focalization of post-War Berlin through the eyes of an 
adolescent boy. There is plenitude in L’eclisse’s famous final sequence, 
where previously seen people, places, and things appear again not in 
service of plot or character development, but, as Zambrano might 
say, “unattached”. And so it is in Picasso’s “Three Musicians”—
which, like René Magritte’s “The Treachery of Images”, really depicts 
just an abundance of independent lines, shapes, and colors that the 
viewer’s mind assembles into a musical trio—and in Pierrot Lunaire’s 
“sprechstimme”, whereby (as in how Antonioni’s camera captures 
both Lidia’s plot-driving Milanese jaunt and the conventionally 
superfluous space outside her fictional world) Schoenberg, revealing 
aesthetically what Zambrano calls those things that, though believed 
“[to be] nothing”, “are something”,26 accentuates both steady 
musical pitch and its absence by fleetingly suggesting and elimina-
ting it from the vocalist’s part. But such is not the case in Bicycle 
Thieves, in whose musical score harmonically consonant major and 
minor melodies repeatedly condition viewers’ emotional responses, 
and in whose highly artificial, if extremely moving, final scenes, 
there is a neat coherence of all cinematic elements in service of the 
story’s message: including recurring shots of a coveted bicycle set to 
tension-inducing music; Antonio’s failed attempt to steal that 
bicycle, which underlines the injustice of another man’s earlier, 
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successful robbery of Antonio’s own, vitally necessary means of 
transportation; and the anonymous crowds’ criss-crossing Rome, 
whose interaction with Antonio and Bruno is by turns punitive 
(berating the former for his misdeed) and indifferent (mechanically 
walking alongside the father and son, coldly inattentive to their 
need). Zambrano’s plenitudinous abundance is thus typical not of 
neorealism but of such modern art as the atonal music and non-
figurative art that she references elsewhere, as well as of Antonioni’s 
cinema, which effectively pursues similar aesthetic goals as its 
modernist counterparts in other art media. 
In “El cine como sueño”, one of Zambrano’s few texts on film, 
cinema (and specifically neorealist, “postwar Italian cinema”) is 
favorably compared to all other artforms for its special ability to 
capture life’s “many faces” and “smallest fleeting gestures”, and for 
doing so with exceptional “simplicity and immediacy”.27 To be sure, 
such an assertion of neorealism’s naivete is certainly supported by 
the fact that it often features the candor of documentary film and 
the unaffected social and psychological diversity of non-professional 
actors. However, despite Zambrano’s praise of neorealism’s “not 
seeming to have any artifice”, Genina’s directorial hand is clear from 
Heaven over the Marshes’s first frames, in which a presumably reliable 
narrator eloquently extols the virtues of characters yet to appear on 
screen, whose suffering is made more moving and noble by a visibly 
bleak landscape, the obvious indignity of which seems intended to 
condition viewers’ moral assessment of the drama to follow. And 
though, for Zambrano, Genina’s film is so true to life that Ines 
Orsini “does not ‘play’ Maria Goretti, but herself ”,28 it is rather 
Antonioni—who said his movies, like the modernist paintings of 
Mark Rothko, were “about nothing, but with precision”—whose 
works more accurately (or precisely) represent Zambrano’s teeming 
reality of “faces” and “gestures”, and do so, according to Zambrano’s 
ethical prescription that humans acknowledge the unknowable, not 
by telling rationally-structured, realist stories like Heaven over the 
Marshes or Bicycle Thieves, but through what has been called 
Antonioni’s “non-figurative spontaneity”,29 or what, quoting Zam-
brano, we might call his stories’ apparent “simplicity” and seemingly 
unrehearsed “immediacy”. 
To see a Rothko painting or a film by Antonioni is to be instructed 
in Zambrano’s ethics; that is, to confront immediately the “many 
faces” and “smallest fleeting gestures” of reality’s plenitude. Like 
twelve-tone melodies, Rothko’s color fields—which lack focal 
points, or anything facilitating an understanding of the whole, just 
as Rome: Open City’s opening and closing panoramas of Italy’s 
capital straightforwardly affirms that city’s role as a battleground 
between liberty and tyranny—establish no hierarchy of aesthetic 
elements and so invite exhaustive observation of their rich chromatic 
textures and, implicitly, the world beyond them. No wonder Rothko 
did not want frames around his pieces, in which he meant to 
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“reassert the picture [plane’s] [...] flat forms because they destroy 
illusion and reveal truth”.30 Likewise, Antonioni’s La notte delibera-
tely eschews any sense of illusionistic, artificial completeness inhe-
rent in such cinematic frames as Rome: Open City’s bookending 
cityscapes or Heaven over the Marshes’s unambiguously Christian 
ending. It does so by shifting visual focus away from what might 
have been the film’s conventional resolution—namely, Giovanni and 
Lidia’s marital reconciliation—to an open field, whose physical 
vastness and thematic independence from the human drama suggest 
that this story is not only about the titular night in the characters’ 
lives. It is also about an immeasurable extra-filmic reality impossible 
fully to grasp, if eminently worthy of philosophical reflection aimed 
at “[revealing]” Rothko’s “truth”. 
So, Antonioni and Rothko are examples of Zambrano’s preference 
that art communicate (or posit) ideas not as directly (or positively) 
as Genina’s plainly pious finale or the morally repugnant hardships 
of the blamelessly destitute Antonio in Bicycle Thieves, a morally 
disoriented Edmund in Germany: Year Zero, or Christ-like Giorgio 
in Rome: Open City. Rather, in the “creative movement” of 
Zambrano’s ideal art, “a conception’s positivity depends on its 
negativity”31—in other words, aesthetic meaning derives, at least 
partially, from what is not put forward directly. On looking at 
Rothko’s No. 1: Royal Red and Blue, an initial, naïve impression that 
it lacks depth should subsequently cast our view entirely across the 
canvas, catching over time myriad details of overlapping colors at 
the rectangles’ edges, which enable a more intense, because delayed, 
appreciation of a most subtle third dimension—measuring only a 
thin layer of paint, and all the richer for having at first escaped the 
eye. Absence thus makes presence possible, or, quoting Zambrano, 
“negativity emerges positively”, as in Deserto rosso’s scene of several 
characters’ gathering in the awkwardly reduced space of an almost 
entirely red interior. Without background reference points or much 
sense of spatial depth, viewers are meant to scour the surface interac-
tion of characters whose individuality and relative differences—like 
Rothko’s colors (or the several paintings in Henri Matisse’s Red 
Studio, whose solidly red interior and emphasis on painting’s typical 
two-dimensionality influenced Rothko)—assume a degree of relief 
by way of mutual contrast that may be starker than, and is surely 
different from, what would be the case in traditional linear perspec-
tive. So it is from what Zambrano might call the “negativity” of the 
absence of naturalistic depth that there can “[emerge] positively” 
Matisse’s suggested equation of humanity and nature in the works 
featured in Red Studio, seemingly infinite tones of red and blue in 
Rothko’s No. 1: Royal Red and Blue, and Deserto rosso’s unsettled, 
nuanced juxtaposition of Giuliana’s strange behavior (presumably 
triggered by her mental instability) and the not dissimilar strange-
ness of Corrado’s demeanor, which is probably best explained by his 
fear of public revelation of his romantic interest in Giuliana, the 
wife of his business partner, Ugo.
18391_aurora_22_tripa_p.1-53.indd   26 1/2/21   10:08
27
aurora | n.º 22 | 2021 
Paul Cella
issn: 1575-5045 | issn-e: 2014-9107 | doi: 10.1344/Aurora2021.22.2
Conclusion
Zambrano’s ethics—according to which humans, ideally less self-
assured than Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, should be so epistemologically 
modest as to not extend their being into incognoscible divine space, 
or, in Zambrano’s words, not to thus “seek to be absolutely”—has an 
aesthetic corollary that praises those artists who, with similar 
humility, stop short of the kind of confident moral affirmations or 
rationally accessible narratives typical of neorealist cinema and, 
quoting Zambrano, prefer rather not to “say” things directly, but 
merely “insinuate that which lies beyond all that can be said”.32 
Though Zambrano never refers explicitly to Antonioni in her 
writings on cinema, she certainly captures in philosophy what the 
Italian master did in his four films discussed above, in which, as 
Donata Panizza has put it, each frame, like the lines, shapes, and 
colors making up Picasso’s “Three Musicians”, is an “independent 
image” related to the others by mere “contiguity”, not “causality”.33 
Effectively, the space between Antonioni’s often randomly, not 
logically connected takes—such as a trademark cut in L’eclisse 
between the low-angle shot of Vittoria looking up and beyond the 
camera toward her friend Anita calling her name at Verona airport, 
and an unrelated, adjacent scene on the steps of the Roman stock 
exchange that purposefully fails to follow the logical progression that 
would have shown viewers Vittoria’s perspective upon raising her 
glance—is like that space separating two notes in one of Berg’s 
twelve-tone scales, or like two facial features in a cubist portrait. 
Indeed, it is like artforms for which Zambrano made her affinity 
clear. Contiguous, not causal, this space is, finally, like the invisible 
causal link between David Hume’s billiard balls, or the indistinct 
boundary separating knowable and unknowable, profane and sacred 
realms of an equally epistemologically cautious, Humean Zambra-
no. It is, to be sure, something that, “[lying] beyond all that can be 
said”, can only be alluded to, or, with Zambrano, [“insinuated”], 
but never the object of rational comprehension. 
32. ibid., 187.
33. Panizza, D., “The Lady Vanishes: 
Antonioni’s L’Eclisse and Photography”, 
Photographies, 7, 1, 2014, 85.
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